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JECT OF OPTIONS CONCLUDED.
The third paper' dealt with the idea of lack of mutuality
as a special defence in equity, in connection with the cases in
the United States relating to the specific performance of con-
tracts in which the plaintiff held an option. The cases dis-
cussed were those in which the option was given for what
the court regarded as a good consideration. None of them
raised the question of the specific performance of contracts
containing an option, where the option was not based on a
consideration, but on a sealed instrument. Suppose B. gives
A. a bond in a penal sum, conditioned to become void, if A.
signifies his desire to purchase B.'s land at a sum named,
and B. conveys the land to A. Before A. signifies his desire
to purchase as indicated there is a formal contract between
I August number, jupra, page 447.
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the parties in which A. has an option to purchase B.'s land.
At common law this formal contract is binding. In some
jurisdictions the formal contract has been abolished by
statute. Where this is true, at least before A., in the case
supposed, has signified his desire to purchase, there is no
contract between the parties. Where, however, the common
law prevails, and the formal contract is still binding at law,
the purely equitable question arises, whether specific per-
formance will be given? The difficulty of answering this
question lies in the fact that it has hardly ever been dis-
cussed. It is true that a bond conditioned to sell real
estate in some States usually appears in almost every con-
cluded negotiation for the sale of land. But it must be
remembered that the existence of a bond conditioned to sell,
by no means necessarily indicates that a formal contract of
sale, in which the vendee has an option, is a correct descrip-
tion of all the contractual relations in respect to the land
between the parties. Of course the bond may indicate the
whole transaction between the parties. B., in the illustration
above given, may have handed it to A. as a gift. In this case
the only relation between the parties, is the formal contract
containing an option. But the bond may coexist, with a
contract between the parties, based on a consideration, for
the sale of land, or the bond may have been the result
of a contract between the obligor in the bond and a third
party, in which contract the obligor undertook to convey to,
or become trustee of the land for the obligee. The facts of
an English eighteenth-century case illustrate the possibility
of a bond coexisting with the relation of trustee and cestui
qui trust. The case is Parkes v. Vilson.2 A. and B. were
brother and sister. B. had a son and two daughters. A. was
possessed of a copyhold estate which he desired to give to his
nephew, and to effectuate this proposed to surrender the
copyhold to the uses of his will. This not being practicable,
because the officers of the court were out of the way, his
sister and heir consented to give, and did give, a bond to her
son, that she would at any time, upon the payment of £2oo,
and upon the requst of her son, surrender the estate to
him. A. died. The son entered, and took the rents during
2io Mod. 515, 1724.
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his life, and died. His mother then entered, received the
rents and died, having by will given the land to the defend-
ant, one of her two daughters. The mother had never con-
veyed the land to her son. The other daughter and plaintiff
in the case, as co-heir with the defendant of their brother,
brought her bill to have a conveyance of one moiety of the
land. Here there was a formal unilateral contract between
the mother and son. The son had given no consideration,
but under the formal contract he had a right to receive the
land on the payment of £200. Between the mother and
her brother, however, there was a unilateral contract
based on a consideration executed by the brother. This con-
tract made the mother in effect trustee for the son, the
obligee in the bond, and it is in this last aspect that the
court regards the case.3
As stated these bonds may also coexist with a contract
based on a consideration between the obligor and obligee.
There are indeed several possible contractual relations
between the parties. The bond may have been delivered by
the obligor for a consideration executed by the obligee. In
that event, besides the formal contract containing an option,
we have a contract, based on a consideration executed, con-
taining an option.4
'The court says: ". . . the mother must be considered by this
court is trustee for the son." Alison's case, 9 Mod. 62, 1724, is iden-
tical with Parkes v. Wilson, except that in Alison's case, the son
was not obliged to pay money to the mother for the conveyance. The
court again treats the mother as trustee. An early and similar case in
this country is Telfair v. Telfair, Desauss, 271 (So. Car.), 18o4.
' In these illustrations I have assumed that the bond contains a time
option to purchase. Where the bond is merely conditioned to convey
land on demand, no possibility of an option exists. A bond condi-
tioned to convey on demand may, of course, have been delivered for
a consideration executed. In such a case there is outside of the bond,
a unilateral contract based on a consideration for the sale of land.
This contract can be enforced in equity, but such action is not an
example of the enforcement of optional contracts. The difference
between such a case, and an instance of the enforcement of an option,
is the difference between the situation of a man who has the right
having paid for land to receive it on demand, and one who has the
right to receive the land if he pays a sum certain. For examples of
the specific enforcement of the obligations to convey land to the plain-
tiff, where the plaintiff had given a consideration for the conveyance,
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Again the bond may have been given, not for a considera-
tion executed, but for a promise on the part of the obligee.
Thus B. may agree to give A. his bond conditioned to con-
vey certain land to A., on A.'s payment of a sum certain,
provided A. promises to do some act. Such a relation, how-
ever, while possible, is by no means probable. What is,
however, not only possible, but exceedingly probable, is that
the obligor has delivered the bond to the obligee in con-
sideration of the obligee's promise to pay the sum indicated
in the bond as the price of the land. In other words, that
there exists between the parties a bilateral contract of sale,
and the delivery of the bond is merely one step in the
formal execution of this bilateral contract. The formal
contract in which the vendee apparently has an option, does
not in fact exist, because it is lost in the ordinary contract
of sale. The buyer, under the circumstances supposed, is
as much bound to take the land as the vendor is to sell,
though his obligations may not be evidenced in the bond,
or be only subject to proof by parole.5 Thus in several
eighteenth-century cases the obligee offering to pay the
price for the land indicated in the bond, has secured the land
in a court of chancery. These, however, are not instances,
as at first they seem, of the specific performance of formal
contracts containing an option, but merely of the specific
performance of an ordinary contract based on a considera-
tion to convey land. For in England the courts regarded
the existence of a bond conditioned to convey land on the
payment of a sum certain, in the absence of other evidence,
and where there was also a bond conditioned to convey on demand,
see Hopson v. Trevor, i Str. 533, 1723; Chilliner v. Chilliner, 2 Ves.
Sr. 528, 1754.
'Under the last supposition the Statute of Frauds prevents the obli-
gations of the vendee being enforced. This does not, however, make the
contract itself unilateral, or give the vendee in any true sense an option.
For a discussion of the subject of the Statute of Frauds and the
defence of lack of mutuality, see the next or Fifth Paper.
Examples of cases granting the plaintiff specific performance, where
the defendant had executed a bond conditioned to convey on the pay-
ment of a sum certain, but the contract enforced was a bilateral contract
of sale: see Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92, 1867; Ewins v. Gordon, 49
N. H. 444, i87o.
DEFENCE OF LACK OF MUTUALITY.
as indicating the existence of a bilateral contract for the sale
of the land between the obligor and obligee.6 This assump-
tion by the English courts was probably justified by the fact
that an option to purchase land was then almost unknown,
while bonds, as part of the machinery of sales of land seem
to have been common. The presumption has been favorably
referred to in the United States.7  It may be doubted, how-
ever, whether there is anything in our practice relative to
the sale of land to justify the presumption.
As far as is known to the writer there is only one case
reported in this country, where a court of equity has been
asked to make the defendant convey his land to the plaintiff
in accordance with the terms of his bond, though there was
no evidence that the bond had been delivered for a considera-
tion, and the defendant, before the plaintiff signified his
willingness to take the bond, had repudiated the contract.
This case is Gordon v. Darnell." Specific performance was
refused. The court apparently has no thought that the
existence of the bond, by itself indicates a bilateral contract
of sale between the parties. As corltracts under seal are
apparently good at law in Colorado, the case fairly brings
up the question whether a court of equity will -.enforce an
option inta formal contract. The theory of the court is
that in equity the formal contract cannot be enforced. This,
'A case reported in Mosely, 37, 1728, is one of the earliest reported
instances indicating this attitude. In that case the condition of the bond
was to assure certain lands. The court says: "That bonds of this nature
were always considered as articles of agreement . . :' Note that
the language of the court is not that the bond is an article of agreement,
but that it is considered as such. So in Parkes v. Wilson, Io Mod. 515,
1724, a case which, as we have seen, hardly involved the question, see
supra, it is said: "The authorities are many in this court that bonds
have been considered as evidences of agreements and the obligors held
to specific performance."
"The sentence from Mosely, quoted in the previous note, is used by
Powden in his work on contracts, page 314, I79O. From Powden it is
taken by Dane; see his abridgment, Vol. VII, page 543, 1824, and by
Dane is used by counsel in Ensign v. Kellogg, 4 Pick. I (Mass.) 1826;
see also Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444, x87o. In both of these cases,
however, there was evidence to help out the presumption that the bond
had been given for a consideration.
a5 Colo. 302, i88o.
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of course, is in accordance with the practice of courts of
chancery generally. The Colorado court regarded the bond
as a continuing offer, and the repudiation of the bond, before
the plaintiff elected to take as a withdrawal of the offer. To
reply to this position it may be pointed out that, except in
those states which have abolished the formal contract, it is
perhaps hardly correct to say that a formal contract does not
exist in equity. The defendant attempted to repudiate his
formal contract, but he could not have applied to a court of
equity to have the bond delivered up for cancellation. There
was a contract binding at law between the parties. Equity
had nothing to do with the attempted repudiation. When
the parties came into chancery the plaintiff by offering to
pay the money had performed the condition precedent to the
obligation of the defendant to convey, and therefore the
contract was no longer a merely formal contract. Yet the
position of the Colorado court will probably be followed in
other jurisdictions in this country should a similar case
arise. There are two reasons for this last statement. In
the first place there is, as we shall see in the last part of this
paper, a distinct tendency with us to regard nude agree-
ments of sale, containing a supposed option to buy at a sum
certain, as continuing offers to sell at the price named, and a
merely formal contract is in equity in one sense a nude agree-
ment. In the second place, as long as courts of equity
refuse to enforce merely formal contracts, fair reasons may
be advanced for refusing to enforce the plaintiff's option
to purchase, where the defendant has repudiated the formal
contract before the plaintiff has elected to buy. It is true
that regarding the contract as in existence at the time the
bill is filed, the plaintiff is as much bound to purchase, as the
defendant to convey. But the contract, the terms of which
the court is asked to enforce, is not a contract entered into
when the plaintiff signified his desire to take the land, but the
formal contract entered into when the bond was delivered,
and formal contracts a court of equity will not enforce.9
' In Warren v. Castello, 19 S. W. 29 (MO.), 1892, the court also regards
a bond without apparent consideration as a continuing offer. The opinion
in view of the facts of the case is dicta. In Parker v. Perkins, 8 Cush-
318 (Mass.) 1851, and Murphy v. Marland, 8 Cush. 575 (Mass.) 1851,
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Of course, where there is positive evidence that the bond
was given for a consideration, courts of equity have no diffi-
culty in granting specific performance of the obligation to
convey the land, either where the plaintiff has a right to
conveyance on demand, or where he holds an option to
demand a conveyance on the payment of a sum certain. 10
For if the court considers that there is a valid enforceable
contract between the parties, they will never regard the
penalty in the bond as an alternative covenant and refuse
specific performance on that ground. The argument that
the penalty gives the obligor an alternative either to pay the
money or convey the land, often pressed, has never been
adopted."
The discussion of options in formal contracts brings us to
the end of the specific performance of contracts containing
an option. The subject, however, would perhaps not be
complete unless an example of a line of cases, which it is
easy to confuse with those which discuss the effect of the
defence of lack of mutuality in cases of option, were not
given. In every case of the specific performance of con-
tracts the court is called upon to decide whether there is a
contract between the parties. When this question, which is
necessarily a question of contracts and not of the specific
performance of contracts, is decided in the affirmative, then,
and not until then, does the question arise whether the
defendant's obligation, which is admitted to exist, can bL
enforced by a court of equity. The question whether the
defendant is under any obligation to the plaintiff to perform
the act which the plaintiff asks a court of equity to make him
specific performance was given a plaintiff who held such a bond, and
who signified his desire to take the land, before the defendant attempted
to repudiate the obligation. Nothing is said in either case by the court
to indicate whether they regarded the bond as evidence of a bilaterat
contract of sale between the parties or as a continuing offer.
"0 For examples see Plunkett v. The Methodist Soc., 3 Cush. 561, 1849;
Johnston v. Trippe, 33 F. 530, 1887.
"Hopson v. Trevor, i Str. 533, 1723; Chilliner v. Chilliner, 2 Ves. Sr.
528, 1754; Butler v. Bartholomew, 12 Price. 797, 1823, p. 822; Gordon v.
Brown, 4 Tr. Eq. 399 (So. Car.) 1846; Plunkett v. The Methodist Soc.,
3 Cush. (Mass.) 56i, 1849; Dooley v. Watson, I Gray (Mass.) 414, 1854;
Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444, 1870, p. 457.
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perform, and the question whether, admitting the defen-
dant's obligation, the court of equity should give the relief
desired, are distinct questions. Unfortunately, however,
for the sake of clear thinking, the term mutuality is used, as
we have heretofore seen,12 not only in the sense of mutuality
of remedy in equity, and also the special mutuality in obliga-
tion required to secure specific performance in equity, but
it is likewise used to designate a requisite of a good contract
at common law. Thus is a case where the plaintiff claims to
have an option and asks specific performance, the court
may discuss the question whether there is a contract between
the parties, and use the term mutuality in this last sense. It
is natural that such a case should be subsequently confused
with those which raise the defence of lack of mutuality to
the specific performance in equity of contracts containing
an option. For instance there are cases decided in chancery
which introduce the idea of mutuality to solve the prob-
lem in contracts presented by one party to an agreement
without consideration having performed a condition prece-
dent to the apparent obligation of the other party. Thus
A. and B. enter into an agreement in which B. promises, that
if A. performs some act, he, B., will convey A. his land.
A. is under no obligation to perform the act, but he does
perform it, and B. refusing to convey the land, A. in a court
of chancery, seeks to compel him to convey. The defendant
may raise the defence of lack of mutuality, and the court
discussing the question whether the defendant is or is not
bound to convey, deals with the defence. Such a case is
Perkins v. Hadsell.1 3 The assignor of the plaintiff, one
Stout, and the defendant had entered into a written agree-
ment that Stout was to have the privilege of selecting from
the lands of the defendant an eighty-acre lot. If Stout
made the selection within six months and went on to improve
the land selected, he was to have the right to demand a deed
before he had paid in full the purchase price. Stout made a
selection and began to improve the lot within the time men-
tioned in the agreement. He assigned his interest to a third
First Paper, May number, supra, p. 270.
'50 Ill. 216, 1869.
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party, who assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff offered
to pay the price for the land, and demanded a conveyance
which was refused. He then brought his bill for specific
performance. The defendant raised the objection of lack
of mutuality. Dealing with this question the court says:
"If the owner of a piece of land executes a written instru-
ment by which he promises to convey the land to another if
the latter will erect a house worth five thousand dollars upon
it within one year, and pay the owner a certain price for the
land within two years, and such person erects the house
within the appointed time, without dissent by the owner,
and then tenders the stipulated price and demands a deed, a
court of chancery would not hesitate to decree a conveyance
on the ground of want of mutuality or of consideration.
The mutuality and the consideration consist in having
actually done, upon the promise of the other party, what
he required to have done, and it is immaterial that it was
done without a previous undertaking to do it."
It will be noted that the case given in the illustration used
by the court is one in which it is probable that the defendant
after he erected the house had an option for two years to
purchase for a certain price.14 This option the court declares
that it is proper to enforce, but the mutuality and considera-
tion refer, not to any possible defence to the specific per-
formance of optional contracts, but to the erection of the
house as an act stipulated for by the defendant, which, per-
formed by the plaintiff, though he was not bound to per-
form it, created a binding contract between the parties. 5
" This was also probably true of the case before them, that is after
making the improvements the plaintiff had the right, but was not under
any obligation to take the land.
I The idea that the performance of the act, stipulated for by the de-
fendant, supplies mutuality to the contract is likewise introduced in
several equity cases, where the act, as in Perkins v. Hadsell was
detrimental to the plaintiff. In these other cases, however, the perform-
ance of the act stipulated for by the defendant, created an ordinary con-
tract of sale and not an option: Wynn v. Garland, ig Ark. 23, 1857;
Scott v. Shiner, 27 N. J. Eq. 185, 1876; Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318,
1882; The Wisconsin, Iowa & Nebraska Ry. Co. v. Braham, 71 Ia. 484,
1887; Bigler v. Baker, 58 N. W. io26 (Neb.) 1894, p. 1028.
An example in which the resulting contract contained an option, but
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It may be, since this is a case in equity, that the defence
of lack of mutuality (which is brushed aside in the paragraph
cited above) had been urged in the hope of impressing the
court with the idea that whether or not there was a sufficient
mutuality of obligation to create a good contract at law,
there was not sufficient to make a contract which equity
would specifically enforce. If this is so, while the argument
had nothing to do with contracts containing an option, it is
an instance of the survival of the old eighteenth century-
idea that, to have specific performance there must be a
special mutuality in obligation not required at law. What-
ever was intended by counsel for the defence, the court
regarded the argument of lack of mutuality as only another
way of stating the absence of a consideration in the original
agreement, 16 in other words as denoting the fact that there
was no contract either at law or in equity.
Where the act stipulated for by the defendant is not
detrimental to the plaintiff, his performance creates a con-
tract, but in these cases, as no reference is made to the sub-
ject of mutuality they are not apt to be cited in cases dealing
with that defence in equity. For instance, B. agrees to give
A. a definite time to make up his, A.'s, mind whether he
desires to take B.'s land at a certain price. Within the
time designated A. signifies his desire to buy. 7 On the
theory of Perkins v. Hadsell that the defendant is bound
because the plaintiff performed an act which was detrimental
to him, there is no ground for holding that there is a
in which the discussion of the defence of mutuality is in relation to the
specific performance of the option, no reference being made to the fact
that the original contract was at least not more than a formal contract on
a nominal consideration, is Stanton v. Singleton, 54 P. 587 (Cal.) i898.
Perkins v. Hadsell has been used as throwing light on mutuality as
a defence in cases where the plaintiff has an option, as follows: Estes
-v. Furlong, 59 Ill. 298, 1871; page 302; Schroeder v. Germeinder, io Nev.
355, 1875, page 336; Guyer v. Warren 175 Ill. 328, i898, page 335.
"Page 218.
I In this illustration there is no option. If A. had until a time cer-
tain to pay a definite sum for an option, the question of contracts raised
by his willingness to pay the sum within the time designated, would
not be different than that given in the illustration.
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contract between the parties.1 8 But in these cases the courts
usually turn to the other, and more generally adopted theory,
that the original nude agreement, which apparently gives a
refusal to one party until a particular time, constitutes a
continuing offer on the part of the vendor, which, if not
withdrawn, being accepted by the other party within the
time stipulated, creates a binding contract.19
The idea that a nude agreement to convey if the vendor
signifies his desire to buy before a designated time, is a
continuing offer, has, as we have heretofore pointed out,2"
been introduced into contracts for a good consideration,
containing an option. The option is looked upon as a
This apparently is the reason for the decision in Davis v. Petty, 48
S. W. 944 (Mo.) 1898.
The principal ease in equity holding this view is perhaps that of the
Boston and Maine Railroad Company v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224 (Mass.)
1849. In that case the defendants had agreed, in consideration that the
corporation plaintiffs would take into consideration the expediency
of buying land for their use as a corporation, to convey to the plaintiffs,
"the said lot of land for the sum of twenty thousand dollars, if the said
corporation would take the same within thirty days from date." Within
the time specified the corporation indicated its desire to take the land
at the price named. The defendant refused to convey *and a bill for
specific performance was brought. The court granted the relief prayed
for on the theory that the agreement above recited, while not a contract,
because without consideration, was a continuing offer which had not
been withdrawn before acceptance. Under the theory the contract
which the court enforced was that which was entered into when the
plaintiff signified its willingness to take the land. The corporation is
considered to have at that moment accepted the defendant's continuing
offer. See also Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55, 1869, pp. 57, 58.
Where the facts warrant it, the idea of the nude agreement being a con-
tinuing offer, and the detrimental character to the plaintiff of the act
which he has performed, is more or less confused in the same opinion.
See Perkins v. Hadsell, supra, and Wilks v. Georgia Pacific R. R. Co.,
79 Ala. i8o, i885, pp. 185, 186. In this last case, though the court speak
of the original agreement as an offer, they treat the ability of the
defendant to have withdrawn it, before the plaintiff performed the act
stipulated for as an open question. See for a similar doubt Wisconsin,
Iowa & Nebraska R. R. Co. v. Braham, 71 Ia. 484, 1887. Unless a con-
sideration can be found in the original agreement giving the prospective
purchaser time to consider whether he will take, the right of the owner
of the land to end all negotiations would seem to be beyond question.
See Gordon. v. Darnell, s Colo. 3o2, i8go.
1 Third Paper, supra, page 456.
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continuing offer. This, of course, is an unnecessary suppo-
sition. An option in a contract, based on a consideration,
cannot be withdrawn. Such an option, therefore, is not
treated as if it were an offer. To call it an offer is to intro-
duce a fiction, and then refuse to carry the fiction to its legiti-
mate conclusion.
21
William Draper Lewis.
See Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 310, i86g, citing Railroad Co. V.
Bartlett, supra; Ensign v. Kellogg, 4 Pick. I (Mass.), 185i; Warren v.
Castello, 19 S. W. 29 (Mo.) i892 for examples of this method of treat-
ing options.
